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Muslims in Surinam and the Netherlands, and the
Divided Homeland
ELLEN BAL and KATHINKA SINHA-KERKHOFF
Abstract
This article invites a rethinking of the relation between homeland, diaspora and reli-
gion. We reflect on Muslims of Indian origin whose ancestors left British India long
before 1947, when the country was partitioned and the new nations of Pakistan and
India were established. The article interrogates the understanding of the Indian dia-
spora with religion as its core feature. It cautions that such a conceptualization often
leads to the perception of the Indian diaspora as a Hindu diaspora and consequently
to the exclusion of Muslims of Indian origin. Empirical evidence is presented illus-
trating that Muslims of Indian origin in Surinam and in the Netherlands feel con-
nected to each other as well as to Hindus of Indian origin through a shared sense of
ethnic consciousness, a sense of distinctiveness, common history, the belief in a
common fate and the perception of their homeland. We therefore argue in favour
of the inclusion of these Muslims in the Indian diaspora (studies). Their exclusion
means denying these Muslims their history as well as rendering them ‘homeless’.
This amounts to a re-enactment of the 1947 partition in the countries which
the Indian diaspora now tries to retain a collective memory of, and tries to reinstate
as their original homeland in which Hindus a`nd Muslims were ‘brothers of one
mother’ i.e. Hindustan.
Introduction
Though initially only a few communities were defined as a diaspora (i.e. the Jewish,
Greek and Armenian diasporas), its older perception as ‘a nation in exile’ was somewhat
broadened and different notions of diasporas were adopted that allowed the inclusion of
various groups that had experienced migration and the attendant anxieties of displace-
ment, homelessness, and a wish to return.1 Consequently, overseas communities of
Indian origin were conceptualized as an Indian diaspora. Accepting Cohen’s argument
that a diaspora can emerge from a growing sense of group ethnic consciousness2,
many scholars now accept the reality of an Indian diaspora with members in different
countries who share such a consciousness that is sustained by, amongst other things, a
sense of distinctiveness, common history and the belief in a common fate. Adopting
such a definition of the Indian diaspora, scholars generally accept the inclusion of so-
called People of Indian Origin (PIO). Taking a closer look we conclude, however, that
such studies on the Indian diaspora are in fact studies on Hindus with Hinduism
firmly rooted in the present-day Indian nation.3 Muslims are generally left out of the
analysis and, if mentioned at all, they are more often than not de-territorialized from
India and re-territorialized to Pakistan.
In most diaspora studies the relation between the diaspora community and its home-
land, whether imagined or real, plays a key role. Indeed, important criteria for calling a
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2, August 2005
ISSN 1360-2004 print=ISSN 1469-9591 online=05=020193-25# 2005 Institute of MuslimMinority Affairs
DOI: 10.1080=13602000500350637
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
0:
55
 2
7 
Ma
y 
20
11
particular group of migrants a diaspora are that the members of that group retain a col-
lective memory of the original homeland and that they are committed to the maintenance
or restoration of that homeland.4 Some scholars therefore argue that since the funda-
mental attachment of Muslims is not to the watan (homeland), but to the umma, or
‘the community of believers, all made equal in their submission to Allah’5, overseas
Muslims of Indian origin should not be considered as part of the Indian diaspora as
they do not consider India as their homeland. Some go even a step farther and want
to extend the diasporic logic to locate the Muslim umma. In order to come to terms
with ‘the limits and crisis of the nation-state’ in a ‘global hegemonic order’, S. Sayyid
argues, for instance, in favour of the perception of the umma as a diaspora without a
homeland, united through a transnational network of faith. Though Sayyid recognizes
the lack of unanimity among those who describe themselves as Muslims, he nevertheless
feels that this diversity does not undermine the reality of a Muslim umma in its diasporic
form.
6
In similar vein, Barbara Metcalf argues that, ‘Muslims today are tied together
globally through a range of institutions and media’ that she thinks, ‘further suggest the
appropriateness of studying this ‘diaspora’ as a single phenomenon’.7 Other studies
have shown however, that many Muslims are part of locally embedded and determined
communities of Muslims and conclude that their understanding of ‘Islam’ is historically
rooted in, and shaped by, their social experience.8
While we neither deny the existence of a Hindu diaspora nor that of a Muslim umma,
we feel that there is a need for empirical studies to establish Muslims’ relation to the
Indian diaspora. In other words, there is a need for research on Indian Muslims’ territor-
ial identities. In this article, we therefore explore the relation between Muslims whose
ancestors were contract labourers who left (British) India between 1873 and 1916 to
work on the plantations in the Dutch colony of Surinam, South America. They now
live in Surinam as well as in the Netherlands9, and it is questioned whether these
Muslims can or should be studied as part of the Indian diaspora. We first of all agree
with Michel Bruneaus’10 proposition that considering the variety in language, religion
and social structure among Indians living outside (present-day) India, one should not
speak of one single Indian diaspora but rather of several different Indian diasporas.
In this paper we present narratives of Muslims of Indian origin in Surinam and in the
Netherlands and question whether they identify themselves as ‘Muslims in an Indian
diaspora’ (suggesting an extra-territorial identity) or in fact as a ‘Muslim diaspora’
(suggesting an identity spatially located nowhere). We conclude that these Muslims of
Indian origin in both the Netherlands as well as in Surinam indeed fit the aforementioned
definition of a diaspora but in a special way, namely as a Hindustani Muslim diaspora.
While academicians increasingly invoke diaspora as a ‘syncretized configuration’ with
‘shifting’, ‘flexible’, and ‘anti-essentialist’ identities with great ‘hybridity’,
11
the questions
we like to address in this article and which invoke an earlier definition of diaspora
structured by ‘a teleology of origin’, ‘scattering’, and ‘symbolic and actual returns to
the homeland’, might look irrelevant in the present nascent global society. Similarly,
scholars who do not recognize the existence of many ‘Islams’, i.e. various syncretic
Islamic traditions, might not believe in the necessity of research into the relation
between religious loyalties and locality, in the sense of locatedness within geographical
space. Yet, by presenting the case of Muslims in Surinam as well as in the Netherlands
whose ancestors had reintroduced Islam into Surinam, we show the empirical
deficiencies of theories that either exclude these Muslims from the Indian diaspora on
the basis of religious difference or exclude them because they are included in a
Muslim diaspora that transcends ethnic bonds and national boundaries. We argue that
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such notions ignore the multiplicity of identities that exist among Muslims, and their
mobile and constructed nature.
Besides, though diaspora studies frequently focus on the relationship of diasporas with
their ‘roots’12, they generally discuss migrant discourses without taking into account the
historical changes ‘back home’, their bearing on diaspora policies, on homeland percep-
tions of the diaspora and on views of the homeland by the diaspora. We emphasize that in
order to understand the relation of Muslims of Indian origin with their homeland, we
have to take into account the partition of British India in 1947 (hereafter referred to
as the Partition) and its bearing on attitudes towards Muslims in India in general and
towards Muslims of Indian origin in particular. We also have to consider the impact of
this Partition on religious grounds, on overseas Muslims’ attitudes towards India (and
Pakistan).
People of Indian Origin in Surinam: Till the Partition of 1947, a Unity with a
Difference
Between 1873 and 1917, 64 boats carried approximately 34,000 Indian indentured
labourers from India (Calcutta now Kolkata) to Paramaribo, Surinam’s capital. The
arrival of these British–Indians in Surinam was closely connected with the prohibition
of African slavery in the region in 1863. Since the first half of the nineteenth century,
British India had already become one of the alternative reservoirs of labour replacing
the freed slaves in British colonies.13 Most British–Indian migrants in Surinam had
come from the Bhojpuri area of British India, now covering the western part of Bihar
and eastern Uttar Pradesh.14 On arrival in Surinam they started working as indentured
labourers on a five-year contract. After five years of very demanding work on plantations,
they could make use of a ‘free passage’ and return to Calcutta.15 By 1915, an estimated
one-third had made use of this opportunity.
16
Two-thirds, however, had decided to stay
and settled in Surinam permanently.
Though these people shared some traditions and at times a language17, their cultural
traditions were rather different and they came with dissimilar ambitions, personal his-
tories and were physically, as well as mentally, variously equipped to face the long
journey and the new circumstances in which they had to live and work. Besides, most
men as well as women had registered themselves as single. Family migration was rare.
In short, these migrants were a varied lot with differences based on language, religion,
regional background, class and gender among other differences. They also encountered
migratory experience and faced different problems while settling in the Dutch colony.
Most of these migrants identified as ‘Hindus’, yet all the 64 boats that had brought
indentured labourers to Surinam had also carried those who identified themselves as
‘Muslims’. According to the personal database of these indentured labourers, the first
boat, the Lalla Rookh, counted at least 35 Muslims18 among the 410 people who had
embarked. All in all, an estimated one-fifth of all these migrants from Hindustan were
Muslim.19 Yet, religion was only one way of identification besides many others such as
place of birth, language, gender, caste, education and class.
Among these migrants, a few might have considered themselves ‘transients’ and not
‘settlers’. Yet, subsequent generations came to realize that they were in a ‘position of
no return’ and abandoned the idea of going back to India. Surinam became their
country of ‘permanent abode’. During their stay in the depots or during the long
journey to Surinam, which lasted for months, some ‘singles’ became ‘couples’ and
friends became ‘brothers’20, and many friendships and marriages (including
Muslims in Surinam and the Netherlands 195
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inter-religious) were long lasting. By 1947 moreover, despite all their differences and
despite having experienced a unique migration history and having been subjected to
different economic and political situations, the descendants of these Indian indentured
labourers in Surinam had evolved into a distinct community with its own and varied
dynamics. By that time these migrants identified themselves as ‘Hindustanis’, evidently
referring to the fact that they or their ancestors had migrated from the northern part of
British India, known at the time as Hindustan. They thus seem to have constituted a
‘Hindustani’ diaspora.
This indeed was a multi-faith diaspora but Hindu and Muslim migrants developed a
strong ethnic group feeling as ‘Hindustanis’ in Surinamwith two common languages (i.e.
Dutch and Sarnami), many shared cultural practices, religious traditions, common
political behaviour, dress codes and food habits, similar educational levels and class
backgrounds as well as an orientation on Hindustan as their common land of origin
and Surinam as their common land of exile, called Sri Ram desh by Muslims and
Hindus alike.21As they all had come fromHindustan they called themselves Hindustanis
and Muslims felt as much part of this Hindustani community as did Hindus.22
As we will show, living away from their homeland Hindustan, had also led to an
increase in the perceived value and significance of religious affiliation; yet at least till
1947, religion did not divide this diaspora. Actually, already in British India during
the decades preceding Partition, Muslims and Hindus had been involved in discourses
on religious identity and territorialism. Those had been the years during which nation-
alist movements rose with accompanying nationalist narratives and ideologies. In this
social context, some Muslim spokesmen had made a distinction between ‘common
nationalism’ (muttahidah qawmiyyat) which referred to a community based on shared
residence that was different from millat which referred to a community based on
shared textual tradition.23 Clearly, in Surinam before 1947, though religiously different,
these Muslims and Hindus were part of the same Hindustani qawm.24
Internal Differences among the Muslim Hindustani Qawm
Our first acquaintance with Muslim Hindustanis was when family members of Munshi25
Rahman Khan, a Muslim indentured labourer of Surinam who had migrated from
British India, approached scholars affiliated to the International Institute of Social
History (IISH) in Amsterdamwith a request for help with the translation and publication
in English of the autobiography of their grandfather Munshi Rahman Khan, written in
Devanagari. As we were already involved in research on the Indian diaspora,
26
the
IISH assigned the task to us and also decided upon the necessity of an introduction to
the actual manuscript. Research for this introduction brought to light a mass of
additional written information and numerous interviews further broadened our under-
standing of this Muslim Hindustani diaspora in Surinam and in the Netherlands. This
material, collected from archives in Paramaribo, Kolkata, New Delhi and The
Hague—narratives available through oral history and secondary written sources—
enabled us not only to get a general picture of the inter- and intra-ethnic relationships
among and between these Hindustanis, but also broadened our understanding of why
and how these Muslims started a process of indigenization of Islam in the Caribbean
context and how they rooted in the new location as a diaspora based on ethnicity and reli-
gion with a lasting orientation towards India and Pakistan.27
Presently, there are around 425,000 Muslims in Surinam and they constitute 20%
of the total population of the country. They comprise the Javanese who came from the
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Indonesian Archipelago and have been living in the country for more than 50 years and
there is also a growing Afro-Surinamese Muslim community. Most Muslims in Surinam
are, however, from Indian descent. Scholars have argued that the history of Islam and
Muslims in the Caribbean can be traced back to long before the voyages of Columbus
in the fifteenth century.28 They also provide evidence that indicates that many of the
slaves who were transported from West Africa to work in the Caribbean were in fact
Muslims. Yet these scholars agree that ‘all these Muslim groups have submerged
almost without trace’.29 With the arrival of Muslim ‘East Indians’ (as they were called
in English), however, in Guyana, Trinidad, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Jamaica, St
Lucia, St Vincent, Grenada and Surinam, Islam (or rather various Islamic syncretized
traditions) was reintroduced in the Caribbean. In Surinam, the Dutch also brought
indentured labourers from the Dutch Indies, principally Java, and most of them were
Muslims.
It was exactly the localized culture of Islam that was highlighted by Muslims in
Surinam and which linked them to different ‘homelands’.30 Muslims from Indian
descent and those from Java rarely developed common Islamic programmes and insti-
tutions and the history of religious institutionalization is based on intra-ethnic rather
than inter-ethnic religious cooperation.31 Nevertheless, among others, religion was ‘a
significant source of identification, demarcation and support’32 for these Muslims.
Besides, and as among Hindus in Surinam, religion was not ‘a private affair’ but the
‘driving force’ for these Muslim Hindustanis who arrived in Surinam with the same
baggage of ‘Indo-Iranian’ practices.
33
Most of them were from the Sunni Hanafi
Mazhab. They celebrated the Eids as well as Muhurram and Milad-un-Nabi and the
strong influence of the Shia and the Sufis of north India could also be felt in Surinam.
Besides, the Urdu language united these Hindustani Muslims but separated them
from the Javanese Muslims and other Muslims more influenced by the process of ‘Ara-
bization’. Urdu in the opinion of some of these Muslims, does not only unite these
Muslims on an ethnic basis but also links them to the cultural-religious traditions of
the Indian subcontinent.34 R. Karsten also pointed out that these Muslims were more
oriented towards (British) India than towards Cairo or Makkah and quoted one of
these Muslims as having said: ‘We could have written to Kairo (sic) or Mekka (sic) as
well but the problem is that they publish in Arabic and never in Urdu or Persian.’
These Muslims in Surinam also preferred links with Lahore and did not seem to have
much interest in pilgrimages to Makkah, according to Karsten.35 This continued even
after 1947, with the difference that Lahore then became part of Pakistan. In short,
rather than disliking this ‘Indianization’ of Muslim cultural practices, these Muslims
in Surinam sought its preservation and invited maulanas from India and Pakistan for
this purpose.
Nevertheless, though united as far as their geographical orientation is concerned, these
Hindustani Muslims in Surinam, and much more so in the Netherlands, broke up in
several organizations and are now divided over many mosques. Fragmentation and insti-
tutionalization began soon after the contract labourers settled as free immigrants in
Surinam. The first and most profound division among Muslims is between Sunnis and
Ahmadis. This separation goes back to the early twentieth century when Surinamese
Muslim leaders were looking for scholars from (British) India to teach them about
Islam. The Surinamese Islamic Association (SIV) approached Himayal Ill Islam in
India for assistance, and he encouraged them to contact Moulvi Ameer Ali of Trinidad.
Ameer Ali then came to visit Surinam and preached the ideology of Ahmadiyyaism.36
Here, like in Trinidad, the introduction of the new ideology caused a schism among
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the Muslims. Soon, the SIV came to be dominated by the Ahmadiyya doctrine causing
many Sunni Muslims to leave and form several orthodox groups.37 Further fragmenta-
tion of the Hindustani Muslims in Surinam continued in the course of the twentieth
century, and since the 1960s and 1970s also in the Netherlands.38 Whereas much of
the fragmentation can be explained by political conflicts and loyalty issues rather than
by ideological differences,
39
the division between Ahmadis (who constitute some 20%
of all Hindustani Muslims) and Sunnis is based on significant theological differences.
In Pakistan, the opposition against these Ahmadis has always been very strong and in
1974 it even led to the declaration in Pakistan that the Ahmadis are not Muslims and
forbade them to perform Haj in Makkah. In the Netherlands, though much less so in
Surinam, polarization between Hindustani Ahmadis and Sunnis only began in the
1960s and 1970s, under the influence of Pakistani maulanas and imams.40 Until then
the differences had largely been understood in terms of ‘Reformist Muslims’ and ‘Tradi-
tionals’.
41
Today, many Sunnis still do not consider Ahmadis as Muslims. This frustrates
attempts to work together and occasionally gives rise to serious frictions between the two
denominations.
In the following section, we explain that despite these internal differences, and possibly
perhaps because of them, the territorial orientation of Muslims in Surinam and in the
Netherlands towards Hindustan did not change after 1947. This can be contrasted
with the happenings that took place among Hindus and Muslims after the partition of
their homeland.
The Homeland Divided
In 1947 an English barrister, Cyril Radcliffe, who had never previously visited South
Asia, designed borders between areas dominated by Muslims and by non-Muslims, as
determined by statistical census data.
42
This looked like the logical outcome of a
British tradition of ‘divide and rule’ during their long rule over the Indian subconti-
nent. By that time religion had become a primary criterion for the categorization of
time periods and of society.43 When the first census of the whole of British India
was taken in 1871, society was mainly divided on the basis of caste and religion.44
Though neither Muslims nor Hindus had constituted homogenous communities,
these means of categorization for census purposes, along with a similar kind of
history writing, presented Hindus and Muslims as fixed categories and divided
history into a Hindu and a Muslim period. Later, when representational politics
were introduced, the size of the population of these groups, described and enumerated
in the census data, became very important, and religion became the basis on which
the majority of Hindus started campaigning against the minority Muslims. In the
long run, this led to a bifurcation of space that resulted in partition, which was sup-
ported by the so-called ‘two nation theory’ according to which Muslims were ima-
gined as one homogeneous group, indeed as a separate nation, and Hindus as
another.45
In short, imagined communities became somewhat real communities and during the
struggle for independence from British rule, several nationalists now had great difficulties
to unite these communities under a common banner. Serious differences developed
between a section of Hindus and Muslims, centred on the power-sharing formula.
When a last attempt to build a political alliance between the Indian National Congress
Party and the Muslim League failed in July 1946, the President of the latter political
party, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, felt that he had no other choice than to subscribe to the
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partitioning of British India, to support the establishment of two independent nations
and to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan.46 The spatial division of British
India according to religious identification culminated in its actual partition according
to Radcliffe’s outlines. In this way, ‘a truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan’ was created
for the Muslims, with one wing in the east and one in the west, and in between those
wings, the Hindus got their ‘Hindustan’.
47
Both nations, however, had envisioned secular states with clear provisions for the so-
called religious minorities, i.e. Hindus in Pakistan and Muslims in India.48 Besides, an
Indo–Pakistan agreement in April 194849 provided Hindu and Muslim minorities in
both countries with machinery to put forward their complaints and get redress. Yet,
the huge flows of Hindus who left50 or were planning to leave Pakistan and of
Muslims from India in the direction of east or west Pakistan during the 1950s51 indicated
that many people considered Pakistan the homeland for Muslims and India the home-
land for Hindus.
Nevertheless, in independent India secularism has successfully withstood the
onslaught of communal thinking expressed in the two-nation ideology, which, as illus-
trated elsewhere, ‘continues to play important roles in the constitution of collective
identity and thinking’ 52 in India. Secularism, whether it is expressed in such diverse
alternatives, ranging from Maoism to Liberal Conservatism, is, however, severely
threatened by communalism which includes sectarianism, ascriptive loyalties, racism
and other such ideological dispositions.53 Communalist thinking in India represents
‘Hindustan’ as the homeland of Hindus only while right-wing political parties and organ-
izations assert that such thinking always existed in India. They have even gained political
power during the last decade with adverse results on the harmonious relations between
Hindus and Muslims.54
These two streams of thinking, secularism and communalism, fundamentally differ in
the way they look upon Islam in India. Whereas communalism sees Islam as the ‘other’ of
Hinduism, secularists question such a rigid separation of Islam andHinduism as a mono-
lithic religious tradition, and rather favour a more syncretic idea. Islam, in their view, is
not alien to India but rather, as argued by R. Khan, ‘a confluence of at least four major
regional, linguistic and cultural variations—the Arab, the Turkish, the Persian and the
Afghan’, who ‘had converged to lay the substratum of a new and distinct heritage of
Islam in India’.55 Khan56 also argues that:
The Indo–Muslim strands have woven into the texture of India’s national exist-
ence a rich design of ‘composite culture’ [. . .]. It is not surprising, therefore, to
realise that the composite culture in India originated in an environment of
reconciliation rather than of refutation, co-operation rather than of confronta-
tion, coexistence rather than of mutual annihilation. The historic roots of crys-
tallisation of composite culture in India can be traced to the period between the
12th and 16th centuries AD when in the Indo-Gangetic plain a continuous
process commingling and fusion took place between heritages originating in
three geographically determined culture-belts, namely the Arabian, the
Central Asian-cum Iranian and the Indian.
Yet, the partitioning of India, which started long before 1947 and has lasted till date, has
even made many a scholar forget about this distinct Islam (or Islams) in India.57 It is now
often stated that Islam does not really belong in India. Besides, politicians in India and
other Indian citizens often support such communal thinking founded on ideas
formulated by organizations such as the Hindu Mahasabha founded in 1909 and the
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Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) established in 1925. Not only do they advocate
homogenizing notions of ‘Hinduism’ and ‘the Hindu community’, they also make a
sharp division between these and ‘Islam’ and ‘the Muslim community’.58
Call from the ‘Homeland’
Since the last decade, nationalism in India increasingly constitutes both citizens who are
territorially concentrated (the nation) and also many of those who are territorially dis-
placed (diaspora). As a consequence of both international (economic) and national
events during the late 1980s, India had to open up its economy and, at the same time,
in order to combat sub-national identities, it also started welcoming transnational iden-
tities.59 After more than 50 years, it seemed that ‘India’s forgotten children’60 once again
became part of India’s foreign policy.The nation-state has increasingly started claiming
its dispersed populations and has constructed itself as a ‘de-territorialized nation-
state’.61 In some cases it is even argued that India should open its doors to those PIOs
who are ‘squeezed out’ of other countries and have no other option than to return to
‘Mother India’. They would then ‘complete the full circle’.62
The new objectives of the government of India (GoI) are, ‘to include the Indian dia-
spora in the nation’ and ‘make them part of the global Indian family’.
63
Yet, considering
the fact that ‘while building homes (nation-states) for the self, nations have often ren-
dered others homeless’,64 it is questioned which definition of diaspora is maintained,
which groups are included in this ‘global family’, and who are now invited to ‘reconnect
with their motherland’. These questions become all the more important as right-wing
Hindu organizations and political parties in India such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(VHP), the RSS and, the most important opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP), gain considerable financial as well as ideological support from so-called overseas
Hindus.
65
Besides, certain countries are transgressed or given different status, import-
ance and privileges. Similarly, one wonders about those whose ancestors headed from
villages of British India, which are now part of Pakistan or Bangladesh. Besides, what
about the Muslims we are here concerned with, whose ancestors migrated from
Bengal, Bihar, and Punjab to Surinam long before the partition of 1947? Does the
GoI include them in their definition of the Indian diaspora?
That India really ‘meant business’ was clear between 9 and 11 January 2003, when the
Ministry of External Affairs of the government of India together with the Federation of
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) organized the first Pravasi Bhar-
atiya Divas in New Delhi. Apart from NRIs, PIOs including Hindustanis from Surinam
and the Netherlands were invited to India to take active part in the panels and festivities
organized during these three days. There was a hitch, however, when Lady Naipaul, wife
of the writer V.S. Naipaul, Nobel laureate and PIO himself, disturbed the festive mood
somewhat. She suddenly rose from her seat with a poser to the (then) Deputy Prime
Minister of India on the secular credentials of the then (Vajpayee/BJP) Government
and asked ‘why must Indian Muslims be expected to have Ram and Sita in their
hearts’
66
. She and many PIOs with her might have wondered whether Muslims (or
Christians) were also extended a warm ‘welcome back to India’. Or was the map of
India only supposed to be hidden in the hearts of Hindu PIOs? The reply by the
(then) Home Minister L.K. Advani was multifarious, but he also maintained that it
was the partition of 1947 that was responsible for such kinds of dilemmas and now
makes it difficult for India to include all as PIOs in its definition of the Indian diaspora.
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Lady Nadira Naipaul, born in Mombassa and of Pakistani parentage, was not allotted
more time to continue her query but she opened the floor for further thinking. A month
later Ruchir Joshi, a writer and filmmaker based in New Delhi, questioned for instance
why ‘Srimati Naipal, the Killer-Begum’ was defined by Tarun Vijay, editor of the RSS
paper Panchjanya, as ‘non-Indian’. Moreover, he asked: ‘Why should an Indian
Muslim be made to feel more affinity with Arab . . . than his own blood brother simply
because of difference in the way of worship?’.67 This incident and subsequent reactions
in the press clearly illustrate the ambiguous relations India has with the Muslim PIOs.
Besides, all too often Islam is removed from India and re-territorialized to Pakistan or
‘the Arab world’ and with it, Muslims too.68
Clearly, the Partition of 1947 is not a thing of the past and was, in the year 2003, still
capable of dividing the lives of people who do not even reside in South Asia. Even though
the victory of the Congress Party over the BJP during the Indian elections of 2004, has
lowered the chances that the Indian diaspora is also divided and considered as a Hindu
diaspora only, religion still seems to fundamentally influence the homeland perception of
the Indian diaspora and clearly not all ‘Indian children’ are welcomed to the ‘shores of
Bharat’.69
The government of India has recently announced that it will provide PIOs with Indian
nationality while they are allowed to keep another. Yet, dual nationality will not be
accorded to all and the Indian High Level Committee (HLC) on the Indian diaspora
recommend that, ‘dual citizenship should be permitted for members of the Indian dia-
spora who satisfy the conditions and criteria laid down in the legislation to be enacted
to amend the relevant sections of Citizenship Act, 1955’. The HLC also includes two
special chapters on Surinam and the Netherlands each and recommends for instance
that, ‘Special measures should be designed to recognise and highlight the achievements
of India’s French and Dutch speaking Diaspora’.70 India has plans with Surinam, such as
the establishment of Indo–Surinamese joint ventures, a mechanism to trace the Indian
roots of the PIOs, to start an Indo-Suriname Brothership Society and the establishment
of a Hindi Chair at the University of Surinam.71 Besides, though Surinam does often not
figure in PIOmaps,
72
the fact that in Surinam ‘East Indians’ constitute 38% of the popu-
lation and still speak a ‘variant of the ‘Bhojpuri’ Hindi dialect known as ‘Sarnami’ is
frequently highlighted by the GoI.73 On top of this, a particular section of the NRIs
and PIOs from the Netherlands will be granted ‘double nationality’. However, pertinent
questions are: who wants this and who will get this?
We shall now examine howMuslims in Surinam and in the Netherlands, who lost their
physical and spatial connection to India, think of themselves as being rooted in India and
whether they continue to derive their identity from that rootedness. Or alternatively,
since India ‘disowned her (Muslim) children’ in 1947, have they not in turn ‘disowned
their land of origin’? And finally, have these Muslims in any way contested Partition
(as a process) or incorporated it in their notions of rootedness?
Homeland Divided: Diaspora Divided?
Clearly, partition is still at work in the ‘homeland’ (India) and influences the perception
of the Indian diaspora. It is important, therefore, to proceed to the empirical level and
question the attitude of Muslims of Indian origin in Surinam and in the Netherlands.
In other words, one wonders whether the partitioning of Hindustan on the basis of
religion also partitioned the Indian diaspora into an Indian (Hindu) diaspora and a
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Pakistani (Muslim) diaspora. In 1953 the above-mentioned British-Indian contract
labourer in Surinam, Munshi Rahman Khan, wrote the following verse in Hindi:
Dui jati bharata se aye, Hindu Musalamana kahalaye,
Rahi Priti donom maim bhari, jaisi dui bandhu eka mehatari
Two communities came from India, and they were known as Hindus and
Muslims, between them existed an enormous love, as they were brothers
from one mother.
74
In this particular poem (chaupai), Rahman Khan describes the friendly relations that
existed between Hindus and Muslims at the time of their emigration.75 He does not
only express his dreams of loving relations between the two communities, but in a way
also refers to the time when the contract labourers left British India: before the
country was bisected into India and Pakistan in 1947, and before the so-called two-
nation ideology seriously infested Hindu–Muslim relations in the subcontinent. After
contract labourers, like Rahman Khan, left British India, the socio-political map of the
subcontinent witnessed dramatic changes, however, and one wonders about the
impact of this partition on the overseas community of Muslim Hindustanis in Surinam.
Rahman Khan, an ethnic Pathan, was born on 11 August 1874 in Barnhart village,
Uttar Pradesh, north India, and set off for Surinam at the age of 24. After completing
his five-year labour contract, he settled in Surinam on a permanent basis and, despite
the regular correspondence with his relatives back home who repeatedly begged him
to return, he never set foot in India again. Apart from poems, religious texts, an essay
about mathematics and algebra for the primary school, and so on, Rahman Khan
wrote his memoirs and produced a unique inside perspective on the history of British-
Indian contract labourers in Surinam.76 Clearly, this first generation of Muslims left
British India at a time when there was not much of a national identity or a ‘common
bond of unity and fellow feeling’. People generally felt their ethnicity as Bengali, Sikhs,
Rajput, Maratha or Hindustani, but not Indian.77 Neither nationalist nor communal
identities had crystallized. The Muslims who migrated to Surinam left India long
before the famous Lahore resolution of 1940, during which the Muslim League stated
that ‘India should be grouped to constitute independent states [. . .] because Hindus
andMusalmans belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and litera-
tures’.78
Though oral and written sources reveal that also in Surinam, between 1927 and 1949,
serious tensions between the Muslims and Hindus developed,79 we have shown else-
where80 that, unlike in India where religious tensions resulted in the partition, in
Surinam, Hindustanis finally opted for ethnic unity rather than religious divide
81
and
remained part of the Hindustani qawm. Moreover, there never seems to have been any
organized support in Surinam for a division of British India on religious lines. On the
contrary, people seemed rather disappointed with these developments in ‘their Hindu-
stan’. For example, in July 1947 a group of young Hindustani intellectuals wrote in its
monthly newsletter, Vikaash, the following about India’s independence and subsequent
partition:
The moment has arrived . . .. Freedom that has taken many years of furious
fighting has finally been regained. It already has been determined that the
remaining 15,000 British troops will leave Hindustan on 15 August. Energetic
men who have given everything for the good cause can now look back on what
they have reached for Hindustan. But alas! It could not be what they would have
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wanted so much: their ideal of a United Hindustan has been destroyed, their
hope has gone up in smoke . . .. Yet! There is hope for the future! Especially
the circumstance that Hindus and Muslims are not strictly separated gives
reason for hope. One expects that both states will co-operate intimately, as
they share so many interests.82
The two-nation ideology, communalism, and the partition have entirely changed
Muslim-Hindu relations in the subcontinent. The birth of Pakistan (which was envi-
sioned as the country for Muslims) affected the status of Islam and of Muslim citizens
in India itself. In Surinam, however, other scholars have argued that ‘the Hindustani
competition with Creoles
83
for scarce socio-economic and political resources’ produced
a strong tendency, ‘within the Hindustani group to neglect the internal socio-religious
differences and to stress the fact that Hindustanis were a group originating in India,
having a common history and therefore a common identity’.84 Actually, though
Muslims of Surinammade history in 1946 when they founded the country’s first political
party, the Muslim Party,85 this kind of (political) unity among Muslims in Surinam,
during certain periods and in particular fields, did not separate Muslims from the
other Surinamese as a separate Muslim diaspora without a homeland.
86
Despite communal frictions, or perhaps because of them, these Muslims strongly sup-
ported a commonHindu–Muslim Hindustani identity and identified Islam as an ‘Indian
religion’. Privately as well as in public, religious distance between Hindu and Muslim
Hindustanis was less than the racial and ethnic distance that existed between these
Hindustanis and communities of Dutch (bakras), African (Ravan jat) Chinese
(Shinoi), Amerindians (Indies) and Javanese descent (Malais). Though we have described
in detail elsewhere that at times, and in several pockets, these Hindustanis were identified
as two different and antagonized religious communities,
87
generally they reacted to
events such as partition, the introduction of universal suffrage in 1949 in Surinam and
the declaration of independence from the Netherlands in 1975, on the basis of a
shared identity as an Indian diaspora with Hindustan as their common homeland.
During the 1949 elections, for instance, in response to Creole hegemony, Hindu and
Muslim Hindustanis formed the United Hindustani Party (VHP) adopting the slogan:
‘Hindu, Moslem, Sikh, Christian; they are all brothers; India is the mother of them
all.’88 Most Surinamese Hindustanis seem to have been disappointed with partition.
What is more, to their minds Hindus and Muslims could and should not be separated
from each other and they took it upon themselves to avoid such a religious schism in
Surinam. Yet, although most Hindu and Muslim Hindustanis chose the path of
mutual collaboration along ethnic lines, this does not say much about Muslims’ attitudes
in post-1947 Surinam, and in the Netherlands, towards truncated India and newly estab-
lished Pakistan.
An Indo-Pakistani Orientation
Today, the more than 300,000 Hindustanis are distributed over two countries: Surinam
and the Netherlands.
89
Approximately 150,000 Hindustanis form a relatively large
(possibly the largest) ethnic community in Surinam, surrounded by other powerful
ethnic groups. The formation of political parties is along ethnic rather than religious
lines and many Hindustanis (Muslims and Hindus) have been united in the United
Hindustani Party since 1949.90 Though there are exceptions, most migrants were phys-
ically cut off from India,91 and until today, especially for Surinamese Hindustanis,
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the journey to India is long and expensive, with India being more than 20,000 km away.
Though Dutch Hindustanis visit India more frequently, we can distinguish a wide variety
of sentiments for India among them. They feel ‘Surinamese’, ‘Hindostani’, ‘Hindustani’,
‘Indian’, ‘Dutch’ or a mixture of these and many other identities. Some of them
also identify as Muslims. None of the Muslims we interviewed in Surinam and the
Netherlands expressed the wish to start afresh in India. Though they identify with the
plight of Muslims in India (in particular with those in Kashmir), they feel that as a reli-
gious minority they are better off in the Netherlands and in Surinam. Yet, the same is true
for Pakistan (and for Bangladesh for that matter). While there is in particular a strong
identification with the plight of Ahmadis there, Muslims we interviewed underline the
fact that many Muslims have been expelled from their country as Pakistan has
denounced the faith of Ahmadis as non-Muslim. They said they were therefore happy
to live in a country where the institutionalization of mosques has taken place in a multi-
cultural society and through the (Dutch) legal and secular system.
92
Though there is therefore no actual desire ‘to return to the homeland’, during our
interviews withMuslims in Surinam and in the Netherlands,93 and during an Indian dia-
spora conference in Delhi in January 2003,94 people often expressed keen interests in
their (territorially defined) roots and some of them had even tried to find their ancestral
places. Clearly these informants could not identify much with present-day India. One
even stated that: ‘Hindustanis have nothing to do with India. This is all a creation of
the media.’ Another mentioned: ‘No, I am not a member of the Indian family. I am Sur-
inamese and not proud of being part of the so-called Indian family.’ Those who had
visited India often criticized present-day India for the way women are treated, the pol-
lution, corruption, indifference of the rich towards the poor, ‘identity politics’ and, last
but not least, general inequalities and discrimination against the ‘Muslim minority in
India’. As one young Muslim woman narrated:
When I was in India, I really felt Surinamese. I wondered: ‘How do these people
live here?’ You see a baby on the pavement and realise how lucky you are to be a
Surinamese. Or you think: ‘Our food is much better!’
Another Hindustani Muslim explained:
When I was in India, I knew I was a Surinamese. When I attended the celebra-
tions on 15 August [India’s Independence Day], I did feel quite a lot. Actually, I
felt these celebrations symbolised the independence of Surinam.
In a similar way one male Muslim asserted:
If you bring a Surinamese to India and you tell him he can stay there, he would
not be very happy about it. He would feel he has lost his roots.
Nevertheless, many affirmed a sense of familiarity with Indians and recognized the way in
which they talked, walked, dressed and behaved; and one Hindustani Muslim therefore
stated that he did not feel connected with India but with the Indians. However, if it comes
to identification with present-day India, none of them argued that they are Indians or
would like to become Indians. Some scholars propose that Pakistan has taken the
place of India as the point of cultural and religious reference for the Muslim descendants
of the emigrants. Van der Burg and Van der Veer,
95
for example, wrote that:
The distance betweenMuslims and Hindus that existed in India was brought to
Surinam by the contract labourers and now also exists in the Netherlands.
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Inter-religious marriages are rare and participation in each other’s ceremonies is
limited. The distance did not get smaller when, with the separation of Pakistan
in 1947, it got a political meaning. From that moment onwards two cultural
points of reference have existed: India for the Hindus and Pakistan for the
Muslims.96
Similarly, Vernooy and Van der Burg refer to a Surinamese almanac of 1955 in which it
was mentioned that the flag of Pakistan (green and white) is the official flag of the ortho-
dox Muslim Organization, the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat-Hanafi Surinaamse Moeslim
Associatie (SMA), and that these Muslims are oriented towards Pakistan.97 This organ-
ization, which was founded in 1932,
98
is still one of the largest Hindustani Sunni
organizations.
99
Should we therefore conceptualize these Muslims as constituting a
Pakistani diaspora after all?
In the 1970s, both Hindustani and Pakistani Muslim migrants started to arrive in the
Netherlands in much larger numbers than before.100 They still constituted small commu-
nities however, and united in order to establish mosques in the larger cities. At the time,
inter-ethnicmarriages becamepopular andwecameacrossmany stories about such relation-
ships.MuslimHindustanis felt close to thesePakistanis,withwhomthey felt religious affinity
and who, they considered, came from the ‘source’ of their Islam. Many of these marriages
resulted in divorce, however, and Pakistani men turned to Pakistan for wives. As time
went by, and both communities grew in numbers, they split up and reorganized themselves
along ethnic lines. At present these inter-ethnic marriages have entirely lost their popularity.
A number of informants told us that Pakistani men married Hindustani women in order to
get a residencepermit for theNetherlandsand that they left theirHindustaniwives as soon as
they acquired such a certificate. Others related about wife beating and cultural differences.
The Hindustani–Pakistani wedlock turned out to be an unhappy one.
The fact that theseHindustaniMuslims in Surinam and in theNetherlands do not ident-
ify with present-day India or with Pakistan does not allow us to jump to the conclusion that
they, therefore, are not part of the Indian diaspora or that they, as Muslims, constitute a
diaspora by themselves without a homeland. Such an argument can only be maintained if
these Muslims indeed do not have a ‘homeland’. This, coupled with the fact that they do
not perceive ‘a founding act of displacement’, would make the category of diaspora
inadequate, as it demands both a displaced population and a homeland, the point from
which the displacement originates. We here argue that these Muslims in Surinam and in
the Netherlands do not only perceive partition as a founding act of displacement but they
also lookupon their lost homeland, ‘Hindustan’, as the point fromwhich their displacement
originates. For these reasons we feel that these Muslims, along with the Hindus, should be
conceptualized as an Indian or rather a Hindustani diaspora.
In fact, these Muslims reject partition and, therefore, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh
as their homelands. They also realize, however, that they have lost their homeland,
‘Hindustan’, by the creation of partition. Nevertheless, they, as a diaspora, keep a
memory alive of Hindustan as ‘the undivided homeland’ in which Muslims and
Hindus shared most cultural and even religious traditions. What is more, they have com-
mitted themselves to the maintenance or even restoration of this undivided homeland.
For that purpose they have re-territorialized their ‘Hindustan’ to Surinam and the
Netherlands. They do not think about present-day India or Pakistan as their homeland
but rather identify with the area once known in British India as Hindustan, the land of
their forefathers. One Dutch Hindustani (who also identified himself as a Muslim and
an Indologist) therefore proposed to speak of ‘an Indo–Pakistani orientation’.
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In the followingfinal section of this articlewe illustrate that such a re-territorialization not
only provides these Surinamese and Dutch citizens with a ‘homeland’ and thus
makes them part of the Hindustani diaspora, but it also allows them, asMuslims, to inte-
grate their Islam(s) in the local context through the, somewhat contradictory, preser-
vation and establishment of trans-local relations.101 In this way, they become a
Hindustani Muslim diaspora.
Becoming a Hindustani Muslim Diaspora through Trans-local Relations
Steven Vertovec attributes the strong bonds of overseas Indians and PIOs with India to
the Hindu connection: ‘For many, if not most, such Hindus India is a sacred space
abounding with sacred places . . .. It is mother India—Bharat Mata, conceived by
many as a goddess herself ’.102 In a similar fashion, we argue that Hindustani Muslims
in Surinam and in the Netherlands identify as Muslims in diaspora and look upon Hin-
dustan as the source of their Islam(s). Indeed, the Islam their forefathers had brought
with them from Hindustan and which has been cultivated ever since, is based around
localized culture and moulded to complement the culture and geography of the home-
land, Hindustan. As stated before, the Ahmadiyya reform movement originates from
what is now northern India. Moreover, the Hindustani Sunnis, who form the large
majority of Hindustani Muslims, are strongly influenced by the Barelwi-school, which
was founded at the end of the nineteenth century in Bareilly, British India, in response
to a number of Islamic reform movements who wanted to purge the Indo–Muslim tra-
dition from its pre-Islamic or syncretistic elements.103 The Barelwi-school strongly
defended religious folk traditions such as the honouring of the Prophet Mohammed of
the saints.
104
Yet, communities in Surinam, and even more in the Netherlands, are affected by the
processes of globalization with increased mobility and a progressive blurring of national
boundaries. Though the nation-state has not vanished and in some ways has even
asserted itself, globalization has caused an intensification of connectedness among
some as well as an intensification of differences among others. As in their ‘homeland’,
Hindustani Muslim in Surinam and in the Netherlands live in multi-cultural societies
where they have to negotiate the parameters of minority citizenship. These Muslims
live in non-Muslim nations where Muslims are increasingly confronted with a feeling
that they are the ‘new enemies of the West’.105 Besides, they come into contact with
other Muslim migrant groups from other nations and with other Islamic traditions and
practices. We argue that, in order to retain their homeland in which intra-ethnic collab-
oration between Hindu and Muslim Hindustanis is thought of as more important than
playing on religious differences, Muslims in both nations as part of a diasporic commu-
nity do practice forms of identity that clearly incorporate multiple sites of affiliation. In
other words, the ‘territorial references of civic loyalty’ are increasingly divided for many
of these Muslims among different ‘spatial horizons’.
106
What is more, this does not only
include Pakistan and India.
Twice Migrants
During the 1970s about 80,000 to 100,000 Surinamese Hindustanis settled in the
Netherlands,107 thereby becoming ‘twice migrants’. Their decisions to leave the country
had to do with Surinam’s nearing independence and Hindustani fear of Afro–Surinamese
dominance.108 Today, Hindustanis form approximately 1% of the Dutch population.109
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Here, unlike inSurinam, they forma rather small and invisible (asmany complain) commu-
nity. Both Ahmadiyya and Sunni religious and cultural practices can still only be properly
understood in relation to the local context and traditions of the colonial regime in British
India, the history of Islam in the region and the influence of Christianity.110 In other
words, the religious loyalties of these Muslims relate to various geographical spaces and
this allows them to ‘nationalize’ Islam in their countries of residence.
Hindustani Muslims in the Netherlands live amidst Muslims from other (Dutch) colo-
nies and Turkish and Moroccan migrants. Yet their mosques and prayer halls are orga-
nized along ethnic lines. In fact, most Hindustani Muslims feel they share more with
Hindustani Hindus than with Muslims who do not look upon Hindustan as their home-
land. Our research outcomes do not provide evidence that the two-nation ideology has in
any simple way been incorporated inMuslimHindustani ideas of rootedness and sense of
belonging. They have neither merely exchanged (British) India for Pakistan as their reli-
gious and cultural point of reference nor have they exchanged their old ethnic identifi-
cations with a new post-modern, or ‘post-Westphalian’111 Muslim identity. Although
this may well be the case for some individuals or organizations, the majority of
Muslims (also) identify as Hindustani and recognize Hindustan as their ‘homeland’.
In order to retain and even expand this homeland, however, these Muslim Hindustanis
resort to trans-local politics that even include new localities such as the ‘Arab world’. In
this way, new syncretic forms of Indo–Iranian Islam are created that are fully embedded
in the Dutch and Surinamese societies.
It is from India and Pakistan that they recruit their imams, and in 1988 the first four
students graduated from a course, especially started by the Hindustani Muslim commu-
nity in the Netherlands with the purpose of training imams as ‘custodians of the cultural
and especially of the religious values of the countries of origin’ i.e. India and Pakistan. At
the same time, however, these imams trained in the Netherlands are considered to fulfil
their tasks better as they possess a proficiency in the Dutch language and have better
understanding of the culture and history of the Dutch society. As their homeland has
been broken-up, these Muslims try to preserve and develop its (Qadiriyyah mystical) tra-
ditions in Surinam and the Netherlands, which reinforce ethnic bonds with Hindus with
whom they share a language, culture and, importantly, a homeland.
In the Netherlands too, there has been some tension between the two religious com-
munities, in particular in the aftermath of September 11.112 Yet, in particular because
of the fact that religion is ‘a significant symbol of identification, demarcation and
support’ for both Hindu and Muslim Hindustanis, these two groups are tied together
as a diaspora united in their perception of a common homeland: Hindustan. Such an
orientation is thus preferred as it facilitates integration in the Dutch and Surinamese
societies while at the same time trans-local relations are maintained and extended. In
fact it provides these Muslim Hindustanis with multiple ‘homelands’: India, Pakistan
and other countries with whom they share the religious traditions prevalent in the
Indian subcontinent113, such as Trinidad, Guyana, the United Kingdom, andMauritius.
Religious leaders from the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan visit the Netherlands to
give lectures about Islam. Local mosque organizations organize trips to the United
Kingdom to participate in religious festivities (and, as one informant pointed out, to
shop in Southall114). Financial help to build up mosques is accepted from various
Arab countries and many more go to Makkah to perform Haj. Two of our informants
estimated that at least five out of the 15 Hindustani mosques in The Hague have Pakis-
tani maulanas. And someone else pointed out that the largest mosque of Amsterdam has
an imam from India.
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These links are not only based on religious loyalties but also on cultural loyalties,
though the difference is often blurred. An interesting illustration of such a trans-localism
and its impact on the indigenization of south-Asian culture in the local (Western) context
is the following: during the birthday celebration of a 70-year old Hindustani Sunni, one
of the speakers during the official ceremony informed the audience that naat poetry115
has almost disappeared from Trinidad and Guyana, and that it is vanishing from
India and Pakistan, but that the art of chanting naat has been well maintained in the
Netherlands and in Surinam. For this reason Muslims in Guyana recently decided to
organize a naat festival in order to preserve the naat tradition in the country. People
from Surinam and the Netherlands were invited.
Many more examples could be given that demonstrate the existence of a trans-local
orientation among the Muslim Hindustanis but also reveal that such relations are, in
fact, maintained to preserve and build up the cultural and religious traditions associated
with the lost homeland. A Surinamese Muslim woman (Ahmadi) explained, for instance,
that Hindustani relations with Pakistan were solely based on religious affinities and on no
other bond. She added that there were many Muslims in India as well who retained
similar religious notions.Moreover, she clarified that Hindustanis do not watch Pakistani
films but Indian films. This woman had visited both India and Pakistan a number of
times. Once, she and her husband located the birthplace of her husband’s grandfather
in a village in present-day India. The people there remembered a story how, one day, a
boy (her husband’s grandfather) had suddenly left the village and had never returned.
Later, after partition, all other relatives had left for Pakistan and no one had remained
in this particular village. Nevertheless, the couple had found ‘relatives’ in the village.
When they had first arrived, members of a Sikh family, not related to them by kinship,
had taken care of them. These people had told them: ‘You found us, we are your relatives
now’. The couple immensely appreciated this gesture of their ‘adopted’ family members
and still communicate with them. Another Hindustani informant, a Muslim who
had migrated from Surinam to the Netherlands in 1970, asserted that Hindustanis
and Pakistanis are connected through religion and language, but not through ethnicity.
He stated that they visit the same mosques because of the common language (i.e.
Urdu) used during the service, yet he was not very positive about the Pakistanis:
‘Their character is not pure, and they lie and cheat.’ He added however, that he
admired them for one thing: ‘They respect their elders.’ The man himself felt more con-
nected with India, however. But, he concluded: ‘India is far, and after all, Hindustanis
are Surinamese.’
We have already drawn attention to the differences among Hindustani Muslims in
Surinam. The Hindustani Sunni Muslims in the Netherlands have three competitive
organizations at a national level. Firstly, there is the World Islamic Mission (WIM) in
Amsterdam with 32 mosques, acknowledging Shaykh Nurani in Pakistan as its spiritual
leader. Secondly, there is the Islamitische Wereldmissie, an organization in The Hague with
two mosques and acknowledging the spiritual leadership of Pir Marouf in Bradford
(United Kingdom). Lastly, there is the Internationale Moslim Organisatie (IMO) coordi-
nating 28 mosque communities and recognizing Abd al-Wahhab Siddiqui, who lives in
England, as its spiritual leader. The Ahmadiyyas are divided in two umbrella organiz-
ations: firstly, the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha’at Islam in Nederland (AAIIN), which is a
Lahori (Pakistani) offshoot; and secondly the Ahmadiyyah Beweging in Islam
(Ahmadiyyah movement in Islam).116 This diversity, and the links to several other
nation-territories besides India, should, however, not be used as an argument against
inclusion of these Hindustani Muslims in the (Indian) diaspora. We argue that though
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there are these minor and major differences among Hindustani Muslims in Surinam and
in the Netherlands, Muslim experience clearly tends to a unity but one that is ‘riddled
with division and diversity’.117 Their unity rests on their common belief in a homeland,
which they share with Hindu Hindustanis. However, since Hindustan has no territorial
base any longer, these Hindustani Muslims have taken it upon themselves, and with the
help of trans-local relations, to rebuild the homeland in their countries of residence with
an Islam that is firmly rooted in those countries.
Conclusion
For more than a decade now, scholars point to the importance of Hinduism in defining
the overseas communities of Indian origin as diaspora. Indeed, some 85% of all people of
Indian origin overseas are Hindus and studies show that, for many among them, India
holds deep spiritual, symbolic and sentimental reverence that is renewed through
regular visits and pilgrimages. Hinduism, these scholars argue, is ‘an ethnic religion’
that is characterized by a strong sense of ‘rootedness in India’. The discovery of a ‘con-
scious that is sustained by, amongst other things, a sense of distinctiveness, common
history and the belief in a common fate’, helps these scholars in feeling that their concep-
tualization of these overseas Indian communities as an Indian diaspora is legitimate.
118
Yet, as among these overseas communities there are many who do not identify as Hindus;
one wonders about those without such a Hindu diasporic identity.
In this article, we did not argue against making religion the core feature defining the
Indian diaspora but we questioned the identification of religion with Hinduism. We
felt that if Hinduism is perceived as an enduring marker of identity in diaspora, it risks
the exclusion of (other) religious minorities from this category. In this way Muslims,
for instance, who constitute a significant element of the overseas Indians in several
countries, are separated on religious grounds from Hindus, and the inclusion of
Muslims into the Indian diaspora is subsequently made problematical.
We argued that the study of the Indian diaspora is incomplete if historical develop-
ments and contemporary politics in the ‘homeland’ are not taken into account. In the
case of overseas Muslims, the partition of 1947 has fundamentally influenced the ways
in which they identify with India and also the way in which India defines its diaspora.119
We have shown that the Indian government policies are now directed towards a re-
territorializing of Indians who live outside its borders and that the government of
India now tries to include ‘people of Indian origin’ in their concept of the nation. Not
all, however, are included as PIOs in the Indian family. Muslims who have migrated to
Bangladesh and Pakistan during the violence that constituted partition are not included,
for instance. In general, more Muslims of ‘Indian origin’ were firstly de-territorialized
from India and subsequently re-territorialized to Pakistan, which is now supposed to
be the real homeland of these Muslims.
Our case study shows that those who identify themselves as Muslims of Indian origin in
Surinam and in the Netherlands also identify themselves as Hindustanis. Among them,
however, a de-territorialization has taken place and none of our informants identify them-
selves as Indians. They also do not identify themselves as Pakistanis, however. They are, in
fact, firmly rooted in the territoryof their landof residence, be itSurinamor theNetherlands
and they share their ethnic identities with Hindu Hindustanis, with whom they not only
share many socio-cultural and linguistic traditions but also a historical luggage.
These Hindustani Muslims reject the partition of 1947, and therefore, Pakistan, India
and Bangladesh as basis for identities. At the same time, they realize that they have lost
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their homeland ‘Hindustan’ by the creation of partition. Nevertheless, they have kept a
memory alive of Hindustan as a country in which Muslims and Hindus share some cul-
tural and even religious traditions. They are also committed to the maintenance or even
restoration of this homeland. For that, however, they have re-territorialized their home-
land to Surinam and the Netherlands. If the Indian government includes them as PIOs
and unequivocally considers these Muslims as part of the Indian diaspora, they might
respond to the call of the ‘motherland’ and help to restore such a Hindustan in India
as well.
Some scholars, representatives of the government of India and some Hindus, as well as
Muslims in various places, feel however that these Muslims of Indian origin should not
be conceptualized as part of the Indian diaspora. Denying their inclusion in the Indian
diaspora would, however, amount to a re-enactment of partition of this ‘homeland’
and an expulsion of these Muslims from the Hindustani qawm. Without such a rooting
in ethnic and territorial certitudes, Hindustani Muslims then might go in search for
new collective identities not structured by the teleology of origin, scattering, and (event-
ual) return. This would be a loss of unique localized Islamic traditions and practices and
might also disturb the present-day relatively harmonious communal relations that exist
between Hindus and Muslim Hindustanis in Surinam and in the Netherlands.
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composition of na’t. Interestingly, the first historical approach to Muhammad’s life was composed
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